the public mind having been thus left in that state of suspense in which every article of information is eagerly discussed, and every new rumour immediately caught up, canvassed, and transmitted. A letter which we have seen from a gentleman in Boston, dated February 18th (a month before the trial), says?" It will be a trial of intense interest; the mind of the community seems to have been already excited to the highest possible point about it; but if the excitement can and should increase, some people will go out of their wits." The trial lasted no less than twelve days ; during its continuance, as may be easily imagined, it absorbed the attention of the entire community; and the interest which it excited was far from being limited to the city or state in which it took place, but was felt throughout the entire Union, and extended even to this side of the Atlantic.
The investigation appears to have been conducted with all the dignity and solemnity, which the gravity of its nature and results required; and its conclusion was one which must (we think) command the acquiescence of every person who may go through the case step by step The great object of all intellectual research is the discovery of Truth : which, in its highest sense, is equivalent to the attainment of a conviction that certain ideas have an actual conformity with the nature and reality of the events and things to which they relate.?There is also a truth of words, as correctly representing ideas ; and as words constitute the form in which ideas are expressed, and by which they are communicated, truth of words is absolutely essential to the attainment of truth of ideas.
The intellectual recognition of truth may be a direct and immediate act of the judgment; this is the case with all those truths which are termed necessary, the assent of the mind being given to them as soon as they are presented to it, because it is at once felt that a belief in anything that is contrary or even different is absolutely impossible. Such But the intellectual recognition of truth may be the result of a more complex mental operation, involving the exercise of the reasoning processes, through which the asserted fact is tried by the test of those truths which we have already consented to believe in as necessary, and is shown to be either an unavoidable consequence of them, or at least to be in harmony with them. When the former is the case, we say that the proposition is proved ; when the latter, that it is probable.
Of the most complete form of this indirect proof, in which the reasoning faculty necessarily talces part, we have a perfect example in a mathematical demonstration. This is nothing else than a series of inferences drawn by logical processes from the original acknowledged truths. Each of these inferences commands the unhesitating assent of the mind, which is not capable of even conceiving the contrary (or anything else) to be possible; and at every step in the process, therefore, we experience the same positive certainty in regard to its validity, that we do in regard to the fundamental truths or axioms ; so that the closing Q. E. D. comes upon us with a conviction of infallibility from which there is no escape. Every proposition thus proved may become the foundation on which another fabric of proof may be built up : and may be used as such, with as much security as the original axioms or first truths could afford. Hence it is that the highest propositions of the mathematician are asserted by him with no more doubt or hesitation, than the untrained mind experiences about the simple and direct assertions which come to it with all the force of intuitive necessity, and which no one in his senses ever deems of questioning. By a demonstrative proof of any proposition, then, we mean a reasoning process of which every step is positively certain, and in which, the foundation whereon it is erected being also perfectly secure, there is no room for possible doubt as to the result. But it must be observed, that the validity of the whole involves the perfection of every part; since each part of the proof is dependent upon every other part; and its value as bringing the factum probandum into the category of necessary truths entirely depends upon the impossibility of error, either in the fundamental assumption, or in the succession of inferences founded upon it. We may compare such a proof to a chain cable, holding a ship to its anchor; if the anchor have taken an immovable hold in the ground,-and every link [July, in the chain be of adequate strength and perfect soundness, the ship may ride by it in perfect security; and no violence of the winds or waves can occasion the least apprehension, if a perfect and well-grounded conviction be entertained, that it is impossible either for the anchor to drag, or for any link in the chain to give way. Supposing such a conviction to have a warrantable existence, it is obvious that the feeling of security cannot be strengthened by the multiplication of cables and anchors;?what is already quite certain cannot be made more so by any concurrence of proof.
But where the completeness of the proof depends upon a series of connected inferences, starting from a single assumption, it is obvious that any deficiency of certainty, either in the fundamental assumption, or in any one of the steps of the inferential process, proportionablv invalidates the whole. Thus, to carry out our simile, if there should be any chance of the anchor's dragging, however strong the cable may be, the vessel cannot be considered as secure; and, in like manner, if any single link in the chain should be deficient in strength, however firm may be the hold of the anchor, and however sound may be the rest of the cable, the safety of the ship is compromised. To those who have not studied the doctrine of probabilities, it is somewhat startling to be informed of the degree in which any combination of such imperfections weakens the entire proof. Thus, if the occurrence of a particular event X, depend upon three antecedent events, A, B, and C, each of which is absolutely certain, then X is equally certain. But if either A, B, or C, instead of being certain, is only contingent or probable, then the occurrence of X is reduced to the same degree of probability with that of the contingency on which it is dependent; thus, if the probability of either A, B, or C be as 2 to 3, the other two events remaining certain, then the probability of X is also as 2 to 3. But if any two of the antecedent events be thus conditional (the third remaining certain), the probability of X will be as 2 x 2 to 3 x 3, or as
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Trial of Dr. Webster. 5 certainty. This designation appears to us far from appropriate ; but as it is in common use, we shall take it as we find it, to imply that kind of assurance on which we act without doubt or hesitation in the ordinary affairs of life, and which can seldom be brought to rest on intuition or demonstrative proof. 
